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Abstract: According to a classic but nowadays discarded philosophical theory, perceptual 
experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and full-blown propositional beliefs 
(Reid 1764/1997, 1785/2000). This classical dual-component theory (Smith 2002) of 
experience is often taken to be obsolete. In particular, there seem to be cases in which 
perceptual experience and belief conflict: cases of known illusions, wherein subjects have 
beliefs contrary to the contents of their experiences. Modern dual-component theories reject 
the belief requirement and instead hold that perceptual experience is a complex of 
nonconceptual sensory states and some other sort of conceptual state. The most popular 
modern dual-component theory appeals to sui generis propositional attitudes called 
“perceptual seemings” (e.g., Tucker 2010, Brogaard 2014, Reiland 2014). This paper argues 
that the classical dual-component theory has the resources to explain known illusions 
without giving up the claim that the conceptual components of experience are beliefs. The 
classical dual-component view, though often viewed as outdated and implausible, should be 
regarded as a serious contender in contemporary debates about the nature of perceptual 
experience. 
 
 
BELIEVING IN PERCEIVING 
“Perception commands our belief upon its own authority, and disdains to rest its authority 
upon any reasoning whatsoever.” 
—Reid 1785/2000, 99 
§1—Introduction 
There is a mass grave of classic philosophical theories that are historically important, 
philosophically interesting, and worth studying, but are presumed dead from the perspective 
of contemporary theorizing. One such view, which may yet have a pulse, is that perceptual 
experiences are complexes of nonconceptual sensory states and beliefs.1 This classical “dual-
component view” (Smith 2002, 67) is typically associated with Reid (1764/1997, 
1785/2000), and is widely considered to be false. There have been many objections raised to 
the classical Reidian dual-component theory (see Smith 2002), but perhaps the one that has 
carried the most weight is the problem of known illusions. In cases of known illusions, things 
perceptually appear one way while we occurrently believe that they are not that way. One 
such illusion is the Ames Room (Fig. 1). When initially seeing figure 1, you may be 
compelled to believe that the woman on the right is nearly twice as tall as the man on the left. 
But upon learning that the image is an Ames Room illusion, and that in fact the man is just 
farther away, you acquire the belief that it is not actually the case that the woman is nearly 
twice as large. Nonetheless, the perceptual appearance persists. Such cases also arise when the 
subject knows she is hallucinating or dreaming. So, the reasoning goes, the classical dual-
component theory is mistaken in taking beliefs to be constituents of such perceptual 
appearances.  
1 Throughout, I will often use the term ‘perceptual experience’, which standardly denotes 
conscious perception. The paper is intended to be neutral on what separates perceptual 
experience from unconscious perceptual states. What follows should, furthermore, be 
compatible both with the claim that unconscious representational contents are always 
distinct in type from conscious contents (see, e.g., Burge 2014, 491), and with the claim that 
any type of mental state that occurs consciously could also occur unconsciously (e.g., 
Carruthers 1996, 135). The primary focus, however, will be conscious perceptual awareness, 
i.e., perceptual experience. 
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Figure 1—Ames Room illusion2 
The dual-component theory has been revived, however, in a way designed (inter alia) to 
avoid the problem of known illusions. There are, after all, many theoretical and normative 
benefits to taking experience to involve both conceptual and nonconceptual aspects (see, e.g., 
Sellars 1956, Peacocke 1992, Coates 2007). On what I’ll call modern dual-component 
theories, the conceptual components of experience are not beliefs but some sui generis type of 
propositional attitude. The dominant form of modern dual-component theories in recent 
years appeals to perceptual seemings (Tucker 2010, Brogaard 2014, Reiland 2014). Brogaard 
writes that “visual seemings clearly are not belief states. You can believe that p even if it 
visually seems to you that not-p” (2014, 383). Thus modern dual-component theorists posit 
a distinct propositional attitude that performs a similar function to belief on the classical 
dual-component view.3 
2 “Ames Room” by Ian Stannard, taken from 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/silly_little_man/5132242358 on 9 August 2015 and altered 
to grayscale and size reduced. Licensed under Creative Commons License Attribution Share-
Alike 2.0 Generic: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/ 
3 In addition to holding that the conceptual components of experience are beliefs, Reid also 
held that the sensory components by themselves don’t make us aware of external objects (e.g., 
1785/2002, 36). This thesis is orthogonal to the disagreement between the classical and 
modern views as understood here. The response offered below to the problem of known 
illusions on behalf of the classical dual-component theory is neutral on whether sensory states 
represent, or perceptually relate us to, external objects. The Reidian version of the classical 
view may fail to withstand scrutiny for independent reasons having to do with the nature of 
sensory representation unexplored here.  
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My primary focus will be the classical dual-component view, which I believe has not been 
given its due. I’ll argue that the classical view has the resources to reply to the problem of 
known illusions without adverting to perceptual seemings. In particular, I’ll argue that 
perceptual beliefs on the classical theory should be formed automatically and may persist 
despite not being endorsed by the perceiving subject, and that this view is still substantively 
different from modern dual-component theories. In §2, I will attempt to get clearer on what 
accepting a dual-component view amounts to, outlining more modest and more ambitious 
versions. In §3, I will discuss the problem of known illusions, how the classical view may 
respond, and how the classical view thus construed differs in substantive ways from modern 
views. In §4, I will conclude. While there may be good reasons to favor modern over classical 
dual-component views, the problem of known illusions isn’t one of them. 
§2—Spelling out the view 
There is a very modest relative of the dual-component view that is somewhat popular in 
contemporary philosophy, which is captured in (1): 
(1) S perceptually experiences a as F only if S is in a state (or complex of states) that 
exhibits both nonconceptual sensory aspects4 and conceptual content representing a 
as F.5 
4 I employ the phrase ‘nonconceptual sensory aspects’ to remain neutral on whether these 
aspects are constituted by nonconceptual representational contents (Tye 1995, Peacocke 
2001), nonrepresentational, purely qualitative features (Reid 1764/1997, 1785/2000), or 
relations to objects or properties (Bengson et al. 2011). I will discuss the distinction more 
fully below. If the nonconceptual element is best understood as exhibiting representational 
content, what follows should nonetheless be neutral, unless otherwise indicated, on whether 
the “state” or “content” construal of nonconceptual content is preferable (Heck 2000, Byrne 
2005).  
5 Note that this is an only-if-statement rather than an iff-statement; these are meant only to 
be necessary conditions, not sufficient. Biconditionals are generally very difficult to 
formulate accurately, as much of twentieth-century Anglophone philosophy shows. There are, 
additionally, many worries about the sufficient conditions for perceptual experience—e.g., 
proper causation (Chisholm 1957, Grice 1961, Searle 1983, McLaughlin 1984, Coates 
2007), relation to consciousness (Chalmers 2004, 2006), and past relations to the 
environment (Tye 1995, Burge 2010)—that would best be left aside for now. Furthermore, it 
will be useful to be able to refine and reformulate the view as we go, and only-if statements 
better facilitate that sort of gradual refinement. 
The formulations that follow will take experiencing-as as primary, rather than some more 
primitive notion of experiencing tout court. Given that all dual-component theorists are 
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According to (1), perceptual experience involves conceptual content as well as a 
nonconceptual component, which may or may not be contentful. Theorists who seem 
committed to (1) include Reid (1764/1997, 1785/2000), Sellars (1956), Evans (1982), 
Peacocke (1992, 2001), Pylyshyn (1999), Lyons (2005), Rosenthal (2005, 2010), Coates 
(2007), Fodor (2007), Tucker (2010), Bengson et al. (2011), Reiland (2014, forthcoming), 
and Brogaard (2014). Those who reject it include Dretske (1969, 2000), McDowell (1994), 
Tye (1995), Smith (2001, 2002), Hopp (2011), Gupta (2012), and Mandik (2012). Though 
(1) is a kind of dual-component view, and is certainly controversial, I will try to defend a 
more restrictive, ambitious, and controversial dual-component view. One example of a more 
restrictive thesis is (2): 
(2) S perceptually experiences a as F only if S is in a propositionally structured state 
that represents a as F and that state either exhibits or is accompanied by a state that 
exhibits nonconceptual sensory aspects. 
Certainly Reid and Sellars endorse (2), as do many Sellarsians, such as Coates (2007) and 
Rosenthal (2005); Fodor (2007), Tucker (2010), Lyons (2005), Brogaard (2014) and Reiland 
(2014) likely do as well. One important terminological caveat, however, is that I use the term 
‘perceptual experience’ to refer to the complex of nonconceptual and conceptual elements 
that the dual-component theorist posits. I do not mean to imply that no dual-component 
theorist can allow for seeing a as F to occur nonconceptually (see, e.g., Reiland forthcoming). 
However, all dual-component theorists have in common the claim that, at least for some Fs, 
nonconceptual and conceptual elements are required for some form of perceptual awareness 
of a as F, and it is that form of awareness that I refer to as “perceptual experience” or simply 
“experience.”  
Dual-component theorists can, of course, disagree on how much they build into each 
component and what exactly the conceptual component is required for. One could argue 
that the conceptual component is only necessary for categorization and presentation of high-
level kind properties (in which case the relevant F should be assumed to be such a property), 
or that it is necessary to fulfill an evidential or justificatory role (Tucker 2010), or that it is 
necessary for perceptual representational content tout court (Bengson et al. 2011). I will leave 
these questions as open as possible, and use the term ‘perceptual experience’ to refer to 
whatever form of perceiving-as constitutively involves both components. Finally, the use of 
‘perceptual experience’ shouldn’t be taken to exclude the possibility that one can have 
committed to some element of experience being conceptual, and given that conceptual 
representations arguably represent things as having features (Fodor 2007), the focus on 
experiencing-as seems appropriate (cf. Burge 2009, 249ff ). 
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conscious perceptual awareness of objects without conceptualization (Reiland 
forthcoming)—it’s simply the term I’m using to pick out whatever all dual-component 
theorists agree requires both components. 
(2) is highly controversial, but leaves it open what kind of propositionally structured state 
figures in perceptual experience.6 An even more restrictive and controversial thesis is (3): 
(3) S perceptually experiences a as F only if S forms the perceptual belief that a is F 
and that perceptual belief either exhibits or is accompanied by a state that exhibits 
nonconceptual sensory aspects. 
(3), unlike (2), restricts the relevant propositionally structured state to the domain of belief; 
(3) rules out any sui generis perceptual attitude figuring in the relevant propositional 
representation.  
I use the term ‘belief ’ to refer to a type of occurrent, representational mental state with a 
distinctive cluster of features: (i) propositional content, (ii) assertoric force or attitude (i.e., 
mentally affirming in a way analogous to the assertoric force of linguistic assertion), (iii) the 
capacity to serve as a mental premise in inferences, (iv) linguistic expressibility in creatures 
capable of linguistic expression, (v) being characteristically linguistically expressed in the 
form of an assertion, and (vi) being disposed to interact in characteristic ways with desires, 
emotions, action, and memory.7 One might instead use the term ‘judgment’ or ‘thought’ 
(e.g., Rosenthal 2005).8  
6 For Reid, such a state is simply a belief; according to Gupta (2012), Sellars rejected the 
doxastic view and instead took such propositional states to be a sui generis propositional 
attitude, “perceptual taking.” 
7 Note that (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) are dispositional features; a particular belief may be 
inferentially inert or isolated from linguistic expression, action, emotion, etc., for contingent 
reasons (e.g., cases of delusion, cognitive dissonance, Freudian repression, aphasia) without 
thereby failing to be a belief (Byrne 2009, Mandelbaum 2014). This point will come into 
play in the discussion of known illusions below. Moreover, (iv) and (v) are not meant to bar 
the attribution of beliefs to nonlinguistic creatures such as animals or infants. All that is 
meant is that such creatures, if they gained linguistic capacities, would be able to express their 
beliefs as assertions—though, admittedly, I’m not sure how to cash out that counterfactual 
claim. Finally, the characteristic interactions I have in mind in (vi) include, for example, such 
belief–desire truisms as, If S believes that if p then q and desires that q, then S will act in such 
ways as to bring it about that p. 
8 Some philosophers think that belief and judgment are different mental kinds (e.g., Lycan 
1986, Schwitzgebel 2010, Mandelbaum 2014). I assume (and they seemingly deny) that 
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It is unclear who, besides Reid, holds (3). In fact, the version of (3) that Reid held is yet more 
restrictive: 
(3') S perceptually experiences a as F only if S tokens a nonconceptual sensory state 
which appropriately causes9 a perceptual belief that a is F. 
(3') is the most extreme formulation thus far, and seems to be the classic Reidian dual-
component view—the view that is widely seen as indefensible.10 It is worth pushing the 
general line of thought behind (1) through (3) to its limit, expressed in (3'). The more 
extreme the view, the more interesting it will be if turns out to be sustainable. I will therefore 
consider the problem of known illusions relative to (3').  
Consider also the following modern dual-component thesis: 
(3*) S perceptually experiences a as F only if S tokens a nonconceptual sensory state 
which appropriately causes a perceptual seeming that a is F.11 
I will not address general objections to conceptual content as figuring in perception at all 
(Smith 2002, Hopp 2011), nor objections to nonconceptual elements of perception 
(McDowell 1994). Those objections need to be addressed in any full-throated defense of the 
view, but the goal of this paper is simply to argue that the objections that target the dual-
component view in particular (as opposed to nonconceptual/conceptual content more 
generally) are unsuccessful. In replying to the problem of known illusions, I’ll argue that (3') 
deserves another look, and should be considered a live account of perceptual experience in 
contemporary debates. In particular, modern dual-component theorists should not be so 
quick to dismiss (3') in favor of (3*). I won’t marshal any positive arguments against (3*), but 
beliefs can be conscious, occurrent, linguistically expressible mental tokens; if one reserves 
the term ‘judgment’ for such states, and uses ‘belief ’ to refer only to unconscious, 
dispositional, and/or inexpressible mental states, then one should mentally swap out ‘belief ’ 
for ‘judgment’ in what follows (though some, e.g., Kriegel 2013, argue that judgment is a 
mental act rather than a state). 
9 I add “appropriately” to rule out deviant causal chains. 
10 It seems to be the one that Smith (2002, chapter 3), for instance, is referring to when he 
coins the phrase ‘dual-component view’.  
11 For simplicity’s sake, I construe modern dual-component views here as requiring that 
perceptual seemings are caused by sensory states. One could certainly hold instead that there 
are separate, parallel causal routes to the sensory and conceptual components of experience 
rather than one linear route. Nothing that follows should hang on this. 
6 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
BELIEVING IN PERCEIVING 
if the problem of known illusions doesn’t make us reject (3'), then one major motivation for 
(3*) has been removed. 
§3—The problem of known illusions 
3.1—Perceptual and central beliefs. As aforementioned, the problem of known illusions casts 
doubt on (3') as an account of perceptual experience. One can see the woman in the Ames 
Room as much taller than the man while also knowing, and hence believing, that she isn’t. 
This fact seems at odds with the claim, at the heart of the classical dual-component view, that 
one’s perceptual experience of the woman as larger constitutively involves a belief that 
represents her as such. The challenge for the dual-component theorist is to construe the 
perceptual belief in such a way that it could withstand incompatibility with other beliefs, but 
without stipulating ad hoc properties and mechanisms that vacate the claim that perceptual 
beliefs are genuine beliefs of any substantive theoretical content. 
Any theorist who accepts the existence of beliefs will likely accept the distinction between 
perceptual beliefs and non-perceptual beliefs formed through conscious inference (call the 
latter “central” beliefs), simply insofar as she accepts that some beliefs are generated by 
sensory–perceptual states without conscious inference, and others are not.12 Consider the 
case of Leah, who is looking at a green square and tokening two beliefs,13 the belief THAT IS A 
GREEN SQUARE and the belief TOM HANKS IS OVERRATED. The former, perceptual belief 
seems to be directly caused by sensory states without any inference, whereas the latter, central 
belief likely involved rich conscious inference. Leah cannot stop having the perceptual belief 
token as long as her eyes are open and she is paying attention to what she sees, whereas she 
could easily stop having the central belief token. If these descriptions of Leah’s cognitive 
situation are accurate, then there is a functional distinction between perceptual and central 
beliefs—even though they are both genuine beliefs. Perceptual beliefs are formed 
automatically in that sensory states give rise to them by some causal process that subjects are 
neither aware of nor voluntarily able to cancel.  
Bonjour notes that the phenomenology of perceptual beliefs supports this automaticity claim: 
I do not infer that there is a red book on the desk, nor does the belief result from any 
other sort of deliberative or ratiocinative process, whether explicit or implicit. Rather 
it simply occurs to me, “strikes me,” in a manner which is both involuntary and quite 
12 Compare Lyons’s distinction between perceptual and inferential beliefs (2005, 249–252). 
13 By the tokening of a belief, I mean the explicit formation of a token mental representation 
to which one occurrently stands in the belief relation, understood in psychofunctional terms 
(Fodor 1978). 
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coercive; such a belief is, I will say, cognitively spontaneous. It is cognitive spontaneity 
which marks the belief as putatively observational[.] 
(Bonjour 1985, 117; emphasis his.) 
According to Bonjour, the intuitive thing to say about the process of perceptual-belief 
formation is that the process is noninferential and not something the subject enacts in a 
voluntary, rational, cancellable way. Classical dual-component theorists can appeal to this 
intuition and thus claim independent grounds for accepting the automaticity of perceptual-
belief formation (hereafter “AP’).  
AP is, furthermore, likely going to be an independent commitment of classical dual-
component theorists. As Reid wrote, for instance, “Perception commands our belief upon its 
own authority, and disdains to rest its authority upon any reasoning whatsoever” (Reid 
1785/2000, 99). Some philosophers may consider perceptual-belief formation to be a matter 
of drawing inferences from our experiences.14 While that might turn out to be true, it doesn’t 
intuitively seem to be true in the typical case. In the typical case, it appears from the first-
person as though we open our eyes and, if there is a tiger before us, we immediately and 
without any effort or inference come to believe that there is a tiger before us. 
AP is further supported by the extensive empirical results that motivate the more general 
Spinozan thesis of the automaticity of belief formation (Gilbert 1991, Egan 2008, 2011, 
Mandelbaum 2014, Mandelbaum and Quilty-Dunn forthcoming). In general, there is some 
empirical reason to think that propositional content tokened in the mind is passively 
accepted and then serves as a basis for further inferences and decision-making even if subjects 
sincerely deny such acceptance (see, e.g., Gilbert et al. 1993). These results, together with the 
more commonsense intuition that our beliefs about our immediate environment are formed 
in a noninferential, involuntary way, provide independent grounds for accepting AP. 
There are also a priori reasons to expect AP to be true (see Mandelbaum and Quilty-Dunn 
forthcoming). For one thing, it seems likely that a cognitive system that evolved to form 
beliefs in real time as a way of acting immediately upon one’s environment would operate 
according to AP. If one perceives a tiger, it would be far preferable to automatically (hence 
immediately, without checking to make sure the belief is rational) form the belief that there’s 
a tiger over there. A system that requires the organism to check whether it really makes sense 
for there to be a tiger in front of it will be slower, and thus more likely to be devoured by 
tigers. Cognition evolving out of perception would have done well (though perhaps not 
14 See, e.g., Siegel ms—though Siegel’s use of “inference” is quite broad and thus may 
accommodate the relevant intuition. 
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epistemologically speaking) to simply accept the outputs of perceptual systems for immediate 
use in reasoning and decision-making. 
Even putting (admittedly, weak) evolutionary considerations aside, however, there are more 
general a priori design considerations that make AP more architecturally plausible than its 
negation. Suppose Leah has sensory states of the kind that typically lead to beliefs about 
tigers. How can she come to acquire the belief that there is a tiger in front of her? One 
possibility is that she sifts through all her beliefs to determine whether or not the proposition 
that there is a tiger in front of her fits into her stock of beliefs. This possibility doesn’t seem 
architecturally feasible, however. Given the vastness of our conceptual resources, it would be 
unwieldy to have to check sensory input against all our background beliefs before forming 
the relevant belief. A much more feasible mental architecture would simply accept whatever 
is conceptualized, allowing the resultant belief to be used for action and inference without 
requiring an ungainly epistemic background check. This consideration is similar to the 
“frame problem” in AI (see Shanahan 2009 for an overview), which has been a cause for 
despair in computationally modeling central cognition (e.g., Fodor 2000). The frame-
problem-like quandary of figuring out which background beliefs are relevant to perceptual 
input and whether that input properly accords with them is circumvented if perceptual-belief 
formation is automatic and ignores background beliefs. Otherwise we are at a loss to say how 
the cognitive system computationally decides which propositions are believed and which 
aren’t.15 
Now imagine that Leah comes to believe that there is no green square, because she thinks she 
is hallucinating. Would she immediately lose her perceptual belief? AP provides us with 
independent theoretical grounds to suspect that the answer is no. As long as the relevant 
sensory states persist, then given their strong automatic causal dispositions to generate 
perceptual beliefs, then we have reason to think that the perceptual beliefs will persist as well. 
This is particularly so if we assume, as commonsense invites us to, that the process of 
perceptual-belief formation is noninferential. Consider how background beliefs (viz., in this 
case, Leah’s belief that she is hallucinating) are supposed to mediate the perceptual-belief 
formation process. In particular, such beliefs are purported to mediate the process in a 
rational way. Leah’s belief that she is hallucinating semantically conflicts with the putative 
perceptual belief that there is a green square before her, and it’s because of this semantic 
conflict that the former belief supposedly shuts down the production of the latter. If the 
process of perceptual-belief formation is a form of inference, then we should expect that, qua 
15 This doxastic version of the frame problem is separate from the similar problem about 
which concepts to apply to a given stimulus, which AP doesn’t speak to.  
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inferential process, it is rationally mediated by background beliefs. But given the assumption 
that the process is not inferential but “immediate” (Reid 1764/1997, 37) and built into the 
architecture of the mind, it’s not clear why we should think there is any such rational 
mediation by background beliefs. On the contrary, if the process of perceptual-belief 
formation is noninferential, we might expect that it isn’t rationally mediated by background 
beliefs, in which case we should not expect the acquisition of contrary background beliefs in 
known-illusion cases to block the formation of false perceptual beliefs.  
3.2—Endorsement. The natural objection to this line of thought is that Leah’s behavior, 
including her speech, would belie the claim that she had a persistent false perceptual belief. 
For instance, if asked whether there were a green square in front of her, she may answer, “No.” 
In reply, the classical dual-component theorist could appeal to the psychological mechanism 
of endorsement (‘ME’). One often has desires one does not endorse, for whatever reason 
(Frankfurt 1971), and there are analogous cases for belief, such as cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1957), implicit bias,16 and more typical cases of unconscious or unattended beliefs.  
In the case of perceptual beliefs, the relevant states are conscious. But that doesn’t require that 
they can’t persist without being endorsed. For one thing, it seems possible that implicit (e.g.) 
racist attitudes might sometimes surface in consciousness without being endorsed by the 
subject. Consider a person who harbors implicit racist attitudes and finds herself inching 
away from someone of a different race on the subway and momentarily becomes conscious of 
this racist belief and its role in her behavior without endorsing it. This sort of case seems 
perfectly plausible (or at the very least, conceivable), and doesn’t require eliminating the 
relevant belief—if eliminating racist attitudes were that easy, the world would be a vastly 
better place than it is.  
Furthermore, the fact that the content of a perceptual belief is conscious doesn’t require that 
the subject is conscious of the state that has that content as a belief. The claim that the 
conceptual component of perceptual experience is belief is a theoretical claim, not one that 
falls right out of introspection. It would be seriously uncharitable to construe the classical 
dual-component theorist (or indeed, any doxastic theorist) as committed to the claim that 
perceptual beliefs always appear as such to perceiving subjects. On the contrary, the classical 
dual-component theorist should hold that subjects simply take themselves to be having an 
16 See, e.g., Payne 2001 for a classic implicit racism study, and Mann and Ferguson (2015) 
for implicit propositional structures; see Mandelbaum forthcoming for defense of the idea 
that implicit attitudes are unendorsed beliefs. See also Rozin et al 1986, Rozin et al 1990, 
Gill and Gilbert 1999, and Gilbert 2002, for (controversial) cases of perceptual beliefs that 
seem to be at odds with all-things-considered background knowledge. 
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experience that such-and-such is the case. Reid frequently stressed that ordinary people fail 
even to pull apart the conceptual and nonconceptual components of experience. In that case, 
he should hardly be read as saying that they will accurately characterize the conceptual 
component as a belief. Instead, the classical dual-component theory should take introspective 
concepts to be more coarsely grained. In that case, the fact that in a known-illusion case, the 
false perceptual belief is part of a conscious experience need not require that the subject 
represents herself as having contradictory beliefs, nor that the endorsement of the true central 
belief requires eliminating the perceptual belief or submerging it below the level of 
consciousness. 
The results in support of the Spinozan theory of belief formation also call for such a 
mechanism to explain why, despite the fact that subjects appear to automatically form false 
beliefs and draw inferences from them, the very same subjects will deny having those beliefs 
and explicitly assert their contraries. There is good reason, therefore, to suppose that in 
addition to merely acquiring a given belief, there is an additional selective mechanism of 
endorsement that involves attributing the belief to oneself and acquiring a willingness to 
assert and defend it.17 Buckwalter et al. (forthcoming) argue on empirical grounds that even 
folk psychology makes the distinction between merely having a belief (what they call “thin 
belief ’), and endorsing that belief, in the sense of making an emotional commitment to it 
and being willing to assert and defend it (what they call “thick belief ’). The dual-component 
theorist could thus say that the central belief is endorsed by the subject and the perceptual 
belief is not, which accounts for the asymmetry in their functional impacts. We can explain 
why perceptual beliefs are resistant to revision by appeal to AP, and we can explain why 
central beliefs in known-illusion cases govern behavior and speech by appeal to ME. 
3.3—Are these really beliefs? One might nonetheless continue to object that perceptual beliefs 
do not act like beliefs, so they are not beliefs. Recall the six distinctive features of belief 
mentioned above: (i) propositional content, (ii) assertoric force or attitude, (iii) the capacity 
to serve as a premise in inferences, (iv) linguistic expressibility in creatures capable of 
linguistic expression, (v) being characteristically linguistically expressed in the form of an 
assertion, and (vi) being disposed to interact in characteristic ways with desires, emotions, 
17 The connection between assertion and self-attribution may be responsible for Moore’s 
Paradox, i.e., the practical irrationality of asserting statements of the form “p, but I don’t 
believe that p” (see Rosenthal 2005 for discussion). 
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action, and memory. 18 Perceptual beliefs don’t seem to occurrently exhibit all of these 
properties in the same ways in known-illusion cases, so perhaps they are not genuine beliefs.  
Four points should suffice to block this objection. First, it is open to the dual-component 
theorist to say perceptual beliefs act like normal beliefs in normal cases. Right now, for 
instance, my perceptual belief that there is something white in front of me causes me to infer 
that there is something not-black in front of me, and (say) causes me to assert, “That is 
white.” If white things made me afraid, then I would become afraid, and if I wanted to avoid 
white things, then I would avoid it. Perceptual beliefs also act normally in typical cases of 
illusion. It is only in cases of known illusion, which is an unusual and particular type of 
situation, that perceptual beliefs act weirdly.  
Second, beliefs, like all functionally specified mental states, are specified in terms of what 
functions they are disposed to fulfill, not which ones they actually do fulfill. All dispositions 
can be muted. The fact that a state does not enact the causal powers that are typical of states 
of a certain type does not, therefore, entail that the state is not of that type. This fact is 
especially salient when the failure to enact these causal powers arises in special and unusual 
cases, and when there are independently posited mechanisms that account for the failure. 
Consider the following truism of both folk psychology and the belief–desire psychology that 
drives much of cognitive science: If S believes that if p then q and desires that q, then S will act 
in such ways as to bring it about that p. This “truism,” as stated, must be either false or only be 
true ceteris paribus. One can have a desire to die and believe that if one jumps off the nearest 
building then one will die, but not actually jump off the nearest building. The reason for this 
is that the rest is not equal in such cases. There may be intervening contrary desires, or 
relevant affective responses, or one may be paralyzed, or there may be other intervening 
factors. There are independently posited mechanisms (varying case-by-case) that explain why 
a state does not occurrently fulfill its characteristic functions in a particular situation. The 
ubiquity of such intervening factors in the massively complex cognitive lives of human beings 
18 One might argue that beliefs constitutively operate in accordance with certain norms, such 
as general coherence. This objection confuses the role of norms in governing causal processes. 
It might be constitutive of beliefs that there are certain epistemic norms governing them, but 
that does not entail that our doxastic practices always will—or even normally do—conform 
to those normative constraints. Likewise, it might be constitutive of human action that it is 
governed by ethical norms, but that should be compatible with the possibility that human 
action is often, usually, or even always immoral. There must be an independent descriptive 
characterization of human action for this possibility to be coherent, and the same must be 
true in the case of belief. 
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is why functional roles are dispositional, and depend on the rest being equal, which it often is 
not. I’ll frequently return to this point below. 
Third, it is an open question to what extent the typical functional role of perceptual belief 
actually fails to be occurrent in known-illusion cases. For example, one characteristic role is 
exciting certain emotions, and a perceptual belief that there is a tiger before you may elicit a 
fear response even though you know that belief to be false—if you’re in a realistic virtual 
reality setup, for example, or knowingly having a nightmare, or, more controversially, 
watching a film (Kivy 2012, Quilty-Dunn forthcoming). Many theorists will deny that the 
relevant state is a belief, but from the perspective of a classical dual-component theorist, it 
seems legitimate to appeal to the characteristically doxastic emotional impact of the 
conceptual component of perceptual experience to preserve the claim that it is doxastic.19 
With respect to inferential promiscuity, though it certainly seems subjectively that we don’t 
draw inferences that take knowingly false propositions as premises, the question is an 
empirical one. Gilbert et al. (1993) provide evidence that subjects under load draw inferences 
from linguistically presented propositions that they are told are false, and the same may 
happen in the perceptual case, though this has apparently not been tested.20 And finally, 
though we will not knowingly assent to the sentence “There is a triangle in front of me” in a 
known illusion of a triangle (such as the Kanisza triangle illusion), we could test reaction 
19 Gendler (2008) argues for the existence of a sui generis type of mental state, which she calls 
“alief,” that is responsible for such cases. I put aliefs aside here for two reasons. I think it is 
quite doubtful that aliefs exist, given that the relevant phenomena can likely be explained by 
appeal to irrationally formed beliefs or activated associative links (see Mandelbaum 2013). 
Even if they do exist, however, Gendler suggests that the representations that figure in them 
are bound only associatively, not predicatively (see, e.g., Gendler 2008, 648). The conceptual 
components on any extant dual-component theory involve predication, and hence 
propositional content. This is important for many reasons (including epistemological ones), 
but most basically to provide accuracy conditions, which are a sine qua non for perceptual 
representation. Since aliefs don’t have propositional contents or determine accuracy 
conditions, they aren’t a candidate for the conceptual component of perceptual experience. 
One might propose a view on which aliefs are propositional, but that reading doesn’t 
distinguish them from seemings or beliefs, in which case they don’t add to the present 
discussion. 
20 Language comprehension certainly seems perceptual, particularly given the commitment of 
all dual-component theories that cognitive states can be constituents of perceptual experience. 
In that case, Gilbert et al.’s results might be argued to show a case of inference from false 
perceptual beliefs. But since linguistic processing is in many ways quite unique, I leave this 
possibility aside. 
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times on judging that sentence and related sentences to be true or false; a higher reaction 
time in judging the known illusory content false would suggest that subjects unknowingly 
believe the proposition and must overcome that persistent false perceptual belief, thus 
slowing down their judgment of its falsity compared to subjects who aren’t under that 
perceptual illusion.21 
And, finally, there are independently posited mechanisms that explain why perceptual beliefs 
fail to fulfill all the functions that are dispositionally characteristic of belief in known-illusion 
cases: AP, which explains inferential resistance, and ME, which explains why the 
incompatible central belief, and not the errant perceptual belief, governs speech and behavior. 
Since AP and ME are both independently grounded, the dual-component theorist can 
explain known-illusion cases while also maintaining that perceptual beliefs are genuine 
beliefs.22 
According to the view articulated here, the conceptual components of perceptual experience 
are the very same sorts of psychofunctional states that are posited in belief–desire psychology: 
the states that are disposed to serve as premises in inferences and interact in typical ways with 
language, desires, emotions, memory, and action. They are specific sorts of beliefs with a 
specific type of content and connection to sensory states, but this does not necessarily make 
them distinct kinds of propositional attitudes. There are many kinds of beliefs, including but 
not limited to: introspective beliefs, mnemonic (memory-based) beliefs, beliefs based on 
explicit inferences, delusory beliefs, implicit beliefs, strong beliefs, weak beliefs, and 
perceptual beliefs. These states all differ either in virtue of their content, their credence, or 
their causal/architectural position, but are the same in that they have the ceteris paribus 
functional role specified above—they are all beliefs.  
The mere fact that perceptual beliefs, on the dual-component view, fail to fulfill their 
characteristic (but ceteris paribus) functions in certain strange cases is not enough to conclude 
that they are not genuine beliefs. All beliefs (indeed, all functionally individuated mental 
states) will fail to fulfill their characteristic functions in strange cases, and there are 
independent explanations offered above as to why perceptual beliefs fail to fulfill their typical 
roles in the strange cases of known illusions. 
More conjecturally, there are arguably reasons to think beliefs can be compartmentalized or 
“fragmented” to some considerable degree, and perceptual beliefs are likely no exception.23 In 
21 I hope to implement an experiment along these lines in the future.  
22 See also Armstrong 2002 and Byrne 2009, 2012. 
23 See Lewis 1982, Egan 2008, 2011, Mandelbaum forthcoming. 
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cases of fragmentation, beliefs occur in “fragments,” or isolated networks, without interacting 
in one giant “web of belief.” The fact that a belief in one fragment can’t interact inferentially 
with a belief in another fragment doesn’t seem to threaten the status of either state as a belief; 
it is a contingent fact about mental architecture rather than an internal feature of the 
propositional attitude that is responsible for the lack of canonically belief-like causal 
interaction. Even if the fragmentation thesis is false, the mere coherence of the thesis shows 
that a belief can still be a belief despite its causal impact being altered by mental architecture. 
3.4—Perceptual beliefs vs. perceptual seemings. As mentioned at the outset, some modern dual-
component theorists argue that the known-illusion objection gives us good reason to suppose 
that there are nondoxastic but conceptual/propositional states like “seemings” (Brogaard 
2014, Reiland 2014) involved in perceptual experience. These putative states are sui generis 
types of propositional attitudes that make things seem a certain way to the subject without 
involving belief. One may argue that perceptual beliefs as construed on the version of the 
classical view articulated here are simply the seemings advocated by modern theorists, while 
central beliefs are actually beliefs.24 I will therefore try to clarify the difference between 
seemings and perceptual beliefs to better understand this difference between classical and 
modern dual-component views.  
Beliefs are affirmative or assertoric in that having a belief involves holding its content to be 
true. If seemings don’t have that property, then that’s sufficient for them to be distinct 
attitudes. But let’s assume that seemings, like beliefs, have an assertoric attitude or force. 
After all, the fact that not just the content of an experience but the experience itself can be 
accurate or inaccurate seems to require that it have an assertoric attitude; contrast non-
assertoric states like desires, which have contents with accuracy conditions but are not 
themselves accurate or inaccurate (Siegel 2010, 33). One difference between them might be 
that seemings do not function directly as premises in inferences—or at least not in inferences 
the conclusions of which are beliefs—and/or that seemings do not stand in the same 
functional relations to language, desire, emotions, memory, and action as beliefs. Suppose 
that a person believes that if p then q; if they also believe that p, then they can directly infer 
that q without the intermediation of any other intentional states.25 Presumably a seeming 
that p, since it is not a belief that p, cannot interact directly with the belief that if p then q to 
produce an inference to the belief that q. Thus perhaps the distinction between the modern 
24 Thanks to the editors for raising this point. 
25 This abstracts away from the possibility that inference involves an additional intentional 
state like an intuition (Chudnoff 2013), which is not relevant to the distinction between 
belief and seemings. 
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view and the classical view consists partially in the fact that the latter view has it that the 
conceptual component of perceptual experience can interact directly with conditional beliefs 
to produce a modus ponens inference the conclusion of which is another belief.  
Or suppose that a person forms the perceptual belief THAT IS AN APPLE and desires to eat an 
apple; they are thus directly disposed to grab the apple. Presumably the seeming THAT IS AN 
APPLE could not interact directly with desire to produce action in this way. The distinction 
between the two views, therefore, may also consist partially in the fact that, on the classical 
view, the conceptual component of perceptual experience can interact directly with desires to 
produce actions. Direct inferential interaction with other beliefs and with desires is a 
(perhaps the) psychofunctional hallmark of beliefs. If seemings are psychofunctionally 
distinct attitudes, then they will not exhibit all the psychofunctional hallmarks of beliefs. If 
that’s correct, and if seemings cannot function as direct inputs in these ways, then modern 
views should predict the construction of an additional representation in order to trigger 
doxastic events like modus ponens inferences and belief–desire pairings, which could in 
principle be tested.26 
One might object that a belief can only trigger doxastic events such as inferences if endorsed 
by the subject. It’s not a necessary assumption of classical dual-component views that 
inferences require endorsement of the beliefs that figure in them. In fact, there are empirical 
reasons to think that many inferences occur unconsciously and even involve beliefs that 
explicitly contradict beliefs the subject endorses (Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum ms). 
Consider the kinds of transitions involved in cases of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), 
such as effort justification: a person exerts a great amount of effort or endures unpleasant 
experiences to achieve some goal, such as joining a group (think of hazing rituals in 
fraternities or harsh military training), and ends up with a more positive judgment of the 
26 Modern dual-component views appear especially committed to the claim that seemings 
require the construction of an additional representation when one considers the putative 
epistemological function of seemings on (at least some of) these views. The perceptual 
seeming that p is the source of prima facie justification for the perceptual belief that p 
(Tucker 2010, Reiland forthcoming), in line with epistemological dogmatism (Prior 2000) 
or phenomenal conservatism (Huemer 2007). In that case, it would appear that one won’t be 
in a position to draw doxastic inferences from a perceptual seeming that p (e.g., pairing with 
the belief that if p then q to make a modus ponens transition to the belief that q) without 
forming the belief that p. If on the other hand seemings trigger such inferences directly, and 
thus can act epistemically just like the belief that p without forming the belief that p, their 
epistemological function in justifying beliefs with type-identical contents seems to evaporate. 
None of these points apply to Lyons’s view, discussed below. 
16 
 
                                                 
BELIEVING IN PERCEIVING 
group because of that fact (Aronson and Mills 1959). Consciously, the person thinks she is 
forming a rational and objective evaluation that the group she has joined is terrific, but the 
sensitivity of such judgments to the harshness of the entrance procedure suggests that she 
performs an inference along the following lines: 
(P1) If the group weren’t awesome, then I would be stupid for undergoing this 
unpleasant experience. 
(P2) I’m not stupid! 
(C) The group is awesome. 
For that explanation to work, this modus tollens inference must be able to operate without 
the subject endorsing it or its premises. Though the subject may in fact endorse each belief if 
asked, surely her endorsements don’t figure in the inferential transition, given how 
vehemently subjects in these cases would deny performing the inference or consciously 
thinking P1 or P2 during initiation at all. 
There is more recent evidence that deductive inferences are performed automatically 
(Handley et al. 2011; also see Braine and O’Brien 1998 for a compendium of results in the 
“mental logic” research program) and unconsciously (Reverberi et al. 2012). This evidence 
suggests that inferential promiscuity is actualized independently of whether the subject 
knows about or endorses the relevant beliefs (see Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum ms for 
further discussion). The evidence allows the classical dual-component theorist to claim that 
perceptual beliefs can be directly inferentially promiscuous without requiring endorsement.27 
If seemings are really psychofunctionally distinct types of propositional attitudes, then they 
are presumably incapable of fulfilling this function (see n26). Herein lies a core 
psychofunctional difference between the two types of states. 
The core of the difference between classical and modern views of the conceptual component 
of perceptual experience is that the distinction between perceptual beliefs and central beliefs 
is not a distinction between types of propositional attitudes, which the distinction between 
seemings and beliefs purports to be. The difference between perceptual and central beliefs is, 
on the classical dual-component theory, an extrinsic relational difference that is determined 
entirely by architectural factors. The classical dual-component theorist thus claims that such 
extrinsic architectural factors do not require positing distinct types of propositional attitudes. 
For instance, suppose Freudian psychoanalytic theory is right that human beings have 
27 NB: It’s still open to the classical dual-component theorist to say that the presence of a 
contrary belief endorsed by the subject will block or at least limit the inferential promiscuity 
of the unendorsed belief. The question is entirely empirical. 
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repressed desires. The distinction between repressed and unrepressed desires is a theoretically 
important distinction, but it is not obviously a distinction between types of propositional 
attitudes; rather, it is a distinction between desires, instances of the same propositional-
attitude type, that is due to extrinsic architectural factors, viz., the fact that one is repressed 
and the other isn’t. The occurrent functional properties of a desire become very different once 
it is repressed, but it is part of the theory that a desire can preserve type-identity qua desire 
across such architectural borders. On such a theory, the fact that repressed and unrepressed 
desires are the same type of propositional attitude is grounded by the truth of certain 
counterfactuals, such as, If desire A were not repressed, it would act just like unrepressed desire B. 
In that case there is no explanatory need to posit distinct types of attitudes, since the relevant 
behavioral differences are entirely explained by the extrinsic architectural factors, holding the 
attitude-type fixed. 
This situation is similar to the case of perceptual and central beliefs. The fact that perceptual 
and central beliefs are the same type of attitude is grounded by the truth of counterfactuals 
such as, If perceptual belief P were to occur in normal circumstances (i.e., outside the context of 
known illusions), P would perform the functions that a normal belief performs in normal 
circumstances. If such counterfactuals are true, there is no explanatory purchase gained by 
taking perceptual beliefs to be distinct types of attitudes, since the behavioral differences are 
fully explained by facts about mental architecture while holding the attitude type fixed. 
Indeed, since perceptual beliefs almost always do occur outside the context of known 
illusions and exhibit the normal functional properties of beliefs, classical theories argue that 
we don’t need to take them to be a sui generis type of propositional attitude. To use an 
example in the other direction, it is hardly controversial that the belief that p and the desire 
that p are genuinely different attitudes; furthermore, the difference does not reduce to 
architectural factors or differences in content but rather requires the subject to take a 
different attitude toward p. Thus where we find a difference that can’t be explained away by 
architectural or other extrinsic factors, we posit distinct types of attitudes. If it’s right that the 
difference between perceptual and central beliefs does reduce to such factors, that’s all the 
more reason to think they are the same type of attitude. 
The fundamental difference between the classical view and the modern view is that the latter 
quantifies over an additional type of propositional attitude, while the former appeals instead 
to independently motivated explanatory apparatuses concerning mental architecture and the 
psychological mechanism of endorsement. Presumably the seemings view does not support 
counterfactuals such as, If seeming S were to occur outside the context of known illusions, it 
would fulfill the functions that a normal belief exhibits (though see the discussion of Lyons 
below). Thus the classical view and the modern view are crucially different in their 
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theoretical commitments. While seemings are of their own sui generis type of propositional 
attitude, perceptual beliefs are merely one among the many different types of beliefs. 
Some modern theorists may grant that the difference between seemings and beliefs 
supervenes entirely on the kinds of factors appealed to in favor of the classical theory above. 
In that case, it would not be clear that the classical and modern views are really at odds 
except insofar as whether they take different architectural factors to be sufficient to generate 
distinct attitude types. Perhaps such a modern theorist would appeal to the different 
epistemic roles played by the relevant types of states—this would fit with the tendency of 
some modern theorists to focus on the special role of seemings in providing evidence (Tucker 
2010, Reiland forthcoming). The considerations above give us some reason to distinguish 
beliefs from seemings considered from a purely descriptive point of view, but perhaps the 
best way of interpreting certain modern theories (though not, e.g., Brogaard 2014) is as 
making a purely normative twist on classical views rather than as delineating separate 
psychological kinds. In that case, we can distinguish between descriptive modern views and 
normative modern views, with only the former being incompatible with the classical view. 
3.5—Lyons and counterfactual functional role. According to Lyons (2005, 2009), the change 
in occurrent functional role in typical and known-illusion cases suggests a difference in 
attitude: belief in the typical case and a seeming-like state in the known-illusion case (see, e.g., 
2005, 242–243). Since both classical and modern views generally claim that the very same 
type of attitude is involved in typical and known-illusion cases, Lyons’s view appears to 
straddle the line between classical and modern views. Lyons’s reason for defending this view 
is that propositional attitudes are individuated by their functional roles, and once a state fails 
to fulfill characteristic functions, it can thereby become a different type of attitude while 
remaining the same token mental state. 
Lyons’s argument seems to rest on an equivocation with respect to the way in which 
functional properties determine the type-identity of mental states. He writes of the 
stereotypical functional properties of belief (e.g., figuring in inferences) that when a 
representation “has this causal role, it is a belief; when it doesn’t, it is a mere percept” (2009, 
71). The notion of causal/functional role is, crucially, a ceteris paribus (and hence 
counterfactual-supporting) notion (see, e.g., Fodor 1978, Loar 1981, Aydede 2005). A belief 
that there is a beer in the refrigerator has the functional role of interacting with the desire for 
beer to cause an intention to walk to the refrigerator. Nonetheless, that interaction might not 
occur if one has a desire to finish writing a paper and a belief that drinking beer will interfere 
with the writing process. The initial belief and desire are no less a belief and desire in this 
case then they would be if their functional roles were actualized. The functional role that is 
constitutive of being a belief contains ceteris paribus clauses that can be violated by many 
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factors, especially including other mental states and processes. In cases like the one just 
described, the initial states maintain type-identity due to the truth of certain counterfactuals, 
such as: 
C1: If the intervening beliefs and desires hadn’t occurred, then the person would have 
walked to the refrigerator. 
Lyons’s argument appears to conflate the occurrent functional properties of a mental token 
with the ceteris paribus, counterfactual-supporting functional role that makes it the type of 
state it is. It’s crucial for the functionalist representational theory of mind that this conflation 
not be made. The point of positing representations is to explain why a certain mental–
behavioral function is occurrently fulfilled (e.g., why the person walks to the refrigerator, or 
why they intend to do so). If the representation is type-individuated only by its occurrent 
functions, then such explanations become trivial, dormitive-virtue28 explanations: a function 
is occurrently performed because of a state occurrently performs that function. The 
introduction of counterfactuals saves functionalist representational explanations from vacuity 
by extending the type-individuation of representations beyond the functions that are actually 
performed to those they perform counterfactually. Since a functionally individuated state-
type is independently characterizable whether or not a token of it actually fulfills a certain 
function on a given occasion, the positing of a token of that type amounts to more than the 
vacuous claim that something fulfills the occurrently observed function on that occasion. 
Thus the functionalist representational theory of mind requires a sharp distinction between 
the actual functions performed by a token mental state and the ceteris paribus, 
counterfactual-supporting functional role that makes it a token of a given type. 
If Lyons’s argument is not making this conflation, then it must depend on the premise that 
the conceptual components of experience lose not only their occurrent causal influence but 
even the disposition to exhibit that causal influence. It is common ground between Lyons 
and the classical dual-component theorist that the conceptual components of experience are 
beliefs in typical cases, and that in known-illusion cases they don’t occurrently fulfill all the 
characteristic functions of beliefs. For Lyons’s conclusion to be warranted, there would have 
to be reason to think that the conceptual components also fail even to counterfactually fulfill 
the characteristic functions of beliefs. If known-illusion cases work as described above, then 
we can spell out the relevant counterfactual:  
28 Moliere famously mentioned the vacuity of explaining the fact that opium makes people 
sleep by saying it has a dormitive virtue, which is empty because it restates the explanandum 
rather than explaining it. 
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C2: If there weren’t a contrary central belief endorsed by the subject, then the 
perceptual belief would fulfill the functions characteristic of a belief. 
If C2 is true, then it seems to secure the metaphysical status of the perceptual belief qua belief 
just as the truth of C1 secures the metaphysical status of the blocked belief and desire as such. 
Lyons claims that being a belief is “not an essential property of a mental state but one that 
the state can gain or lose over time” (2005, 243). If we assume that belief is a relation to a 
mental representation (Fodor 1978), then it does seem conceivable that we could come to 
bear a different relation to that mental representation without its losing its token-identity. 
Lyons’s claim thus seems to be correct. It’s not clear, unfortunately, how to tell when we cease 
to stand in the belief relation to a token mental representation. The reason it’s difficult to tell 
is that losing the belief relation cannot consist merely in the representation’s failing to 
occurrently fulfill characteristic functions of belief; it must be that it loses the functional role 
understood in ceteris paribus, counterfactual-supporting terms. Thus counterfactuals like C1 
must no longer be true of a representation for it to no longer be “in the belief box” (Schiffer 
1981). An additional constraint must be that those counterfactuals aren’t trivial, like C3: 
C3: If the mental representation were altered in such a way to fulfill the functions 
characteristic of a belief, then it would be a belief. 
The burden on Lyons to refute the classical dual-component view articulated in this paper 
would be to show that C2 is really a trivial counterfactual like C3. Prima facie, at least, C2 
looks more like a substantive counterfactual like C1 and seems to specify non-trivial 
circumstances in which the representation would act like a normal belief, circumstances that 
are just like those in C1 (viz., the contingent presence of mental states and processes that 
block the functioning of the relevant state).  
One may object that while there may be intervening states and processes that limit a state’s 
causal powers without changing its psychofunctional type, there is something special about 
the case of known illusions. In particular, the perceptual belief that p has its powers limited 
by (inter alia) the belief that not-p. Perhaps this case is different in some way from ordinary 
cases of mental dispositions being blocked by other mental states; perhaps the existence of 
the contrary belief changes the functional role of the conceptual component of the 
experience in such a way as to make it fail to be a belief. This suggestion is implausible, 
however, for the simple reason that there can be contradictory beliefs. One may have an 
implicit homophobic belief whose dispositions are blocked by a contrary conscious 
egalitarian belief; the former belief doesn’t fail to be a belief on those grounds alone. The 
homophobic belief may fail to occurrently exhibit certain functional properties such as 
inferential promiscuity, but it doesn’t follow that it also loses even the disposition to exhibit 
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those properties. Similarly, while a perceptual belief in a known-illusion case may not 
actually trigger inferences, it needs to be shown that it also loses the disposition to trigger 
inferences. The existence of a contrary central belief seems to operate like an ordinary 
psychofunctional defeater: if it is present, the blocked state retains its dispositions but fails to 
actualize them, and if it is removed, the blocked state will be able to actualize its dispositions. 
There is no reason to think that the existence of a contrary central belief changes the ceteris 
paribus, counterfactual-supporting functional role of a perceptual belief simply because it 
limits its occurrent causal interactions. 
3.6—Folk psychology. Finally, one might raise the objection that the classical dual-component 
theory’s response to the problem of known illusions conflicts with folk psychology. The 
general ceteris paribus functional role attributed to beliefs in this paper, however, seems (to 
me) perfectly commonsense, or at least is not obviously incompatible with the folk-
psychological notion of belief. A theory can posit the same kind of beliefs posited by folk 
psychology while nonetheless going beyond or contradicting folk psychology in judging 
whether a certain case involves beliefs. As Fodor wrote in the context of defending the 
general contours of commonsense belief–desire psychology, “A lot of what common sense 
believes about the attitudes must surely be false (a lot of what common sense believes about 
anything must surely be false)” (1987, 15). Perhaps scientific psychology has uncovered that 
we house racist beliefs we don’t know about; surely the fact that that empirical claim is not 
contained in folk psychology does not undermine the fact that scientific psychology concerns 
beliefs, and quantifies over them in its explanation of racist behavior. Likewise, the notion of 
belief that perceptual beliefs satisfy may accord with the general notion of belief from folk 
psychology even though folk psychology wouldn’t attribute persistent false beliefs in known-
illusion cases. Cognitive science can preserve the folk-psychological kind belief without 
preserving all folk intuitions about which cases do and don’t involve belief.  
Furthermore, claims about the contents of these folk intuitions are empirically testable. And 
as it turns out, ordinary speakers of English attribute beliefs even when they do not 
occurrently exhibit standard functional properties, such as in cases of persistent delusions 
that conflict with the deluded person’s behavior (Rose et al. 2014). This suggests that folk 
psychology does allow preservation of attitude-type despite lack of occurrent fulfillment of 
characteristic functions. And as aforementioned, Buckwalter et al. (forthcoming) use data 
such as this to argue that the folk even draw the distinction between endorsed and 
unendorsed beliefs. A blanket appeal to folk psychology against the classical dual-component 
view therefore appears to oversimplify the content of folk psychology. 
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§4—Conclusion 
The dual-component theory, in any of its forms, is a substantive and explanatorily powerful 
account of human perceptual experience. The classical form of the view, according to which 
the conceptual components of experience are beliefs, has been largely put aside. The problem 
of known illusions has been a primary reason for putting aside the classical dual-component 
view. I’ve argued that the classical view has the resources to answer this challenge without 
giving up its core claims. The classical dual-component theory—or indeed any sort of dual-
component theory—faces other objections not explored here, some of which may be fatal. 
Nonetheless, the classical dual-component theory shouldn’t be rejected simply because of the 
problem of known illusions. Philosophers of perception in general, and modern dual-
component theorists in particular, should take the classical dual-component theory 
seriously.29 
29 I’m grateful to Jake Berger, Simon Brown, Becko Copenhaver, Ryan DeChant, Nemira 
Gasiunas, Grace Helton, Zoe Jenkin, Alex Kiefer, Eric Mandelbaum, Ben Phillips, Jesse 
Prinz, David Rosenthal, and Henry Shevlin for comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks to 
Jack Lyons and Indrek Reiland for many helpful comments. 
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